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ABSTRACT: What happened to the Platonic Academy in late Hellenistic and Early Imperial Age is 
a controversial point. For a long period it has been a widely held view that the Academy continued to 
operate until the Emperor Justinian closed it in the 529 A.D. But in opposition to this view some 
challenging studies argued that it rather ended its activity around 86 b.C., during and in consequence 
of the Mithridatic War, when the garden of the Academy was destroyed by Sulla's troops. Needless to 
say, neither this new (and more solid) reconstruction solved all the ambiguities, and more recently 
some doubts have been raised against it. By reconsidering the available evidence, aim of the paper is a 
reapprisal of this vetus quaestio. In fact, the problems are two: the problem of the end of the 
Academy as a working institution is not the same as its end in the sense of its destruction. The two 
points not necessarily imply each other. And even though one may cast doubts that the Academy was 
physically destroyed, the surviving testimonies appear to show that there was not anymore Academic 
teaching in Athens. Even more fatal than Sulla's troops, were the internal struggles. But not 
everything went lost, for the term 'Academic' continued to be used in the following centuries, 
confirming the importance of the tradition stemming from Plato: for at stake in the use and 




One eloquent result of the great era of the German Altertumwissenschaft was the reconstruction of 
the history of the Academy and of its scholarchs – an impressive application of Niebuhr's claim that 
the historian is someone who «can make a complete picture from separate fragments»1. Indeed, in the 
ancient sources there were many mentions to the Athenian philosophical life, often in association with 
the Academy, but always in a scattered and fragmentary way. The most notorious episode was the 
edict by the Emperor Justinian, who closed the school in 529 A.D., in the same year of the foundation 
of the first Christian monastery by St. Benedikt in Montecassino – a very symbolic date, marking the 
end of the ancient educational system and the beginning of a new institution. But the history informs 
us of more benevolent Emperors: Marcus Aurelius, above all, who restructured the Athenian 
philosophical teaching in 176 A.D. Less known but not less important, were then the various 
references to many Academic professors operating in Athens, such as Ammonius, Plutarch's teacher 
in I cent. A.D., or Calvenus Taurus in the II cont. A.D. How to make sense of all these and many 
other confusing testimonies? Giving proof of patience and great erudition the German scholar Karl 
Gottlob Zumpt ordered the testimonies, filled the gaps and presented his history of the Academy 
from Plato to Justinian, the result being summarized in his 'Tabelle über die Succession der 
Scholarchen in Athen'2. This list was readily incorporated in the monumental Ueberweg - Praechter's 
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (cf. 12ed. Berlin 1926, p. 663-666), and Zumpt's account 
soon, and for a long period, exerted an almost all-pervasive influence, as one can for instance draw 
                                                
* I wish to thank Pierluigi Donini and Tiziano Dorandi for many helpful suggestions. 
1 Quoted in Glucker 1978, p. 335. 
2 On Zumpt, cf. Glucker 1978, p. 330-337 with further bibliographical references. 
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from another authoritative book on the Classical World, Henri-Irénée Marrou's A History of 
Education in Antiquity: 
 
«We can follow the succession – diadoche – in the four greatest schools almost without a break 
trhrough the Hellenistic period and to the end of Antiquity» (english ed. New York 1956, p. 207). 
 
Zumpt's conclusions dominated all along the XIXth century and deep into the XXth, but did not 
arrive to the XXIst century. For in the seventies of the previous century his reconstruction was 
systematically refuted by many scholars, most notably by John Lynch in his book on the Lyceum 
(1972) and John Glucker in his book on the Academy (1978). To put it briefly, these scholars 
demonstrated that if Justinian closed any school (which is controversial) it was a Neoplatonic school 
that was closed, a school which had no relation with Plato's Academy; nor had any institutional 
relation with the Academy the various Academies run by professors such as Ammonius and Taurus 
nor the imperial school founded by Marcus Aurelius, for the very simple reason that the Academy 
ceased to function around the first half of the eighties of the first century b.c., at the time of the 
Mithdridatic war and of Sulla's siege of Athens. (Athens was taken by Sulla in March 86 b.C.)3. 
 
A new challenge? 
After the ground-breaking monographs by John Glucker and John P. Lynch the interest in the 
Hellenistic Academy and in Early Imperial and Late Antique Platonism – in brief, in the history of 
Platonism in all its ramifications – greatly proliferated and a better understanding was reached from 
both the philosophical and from the historical point of view. By consequence of this renewal of 
studies, some or many particular aspects of the reconstruction proposed by the two scholars were also 
re-considered and some major objections were raised. But untill recently, criticisms and remarks did 
not address the end of the Academy; that it ceased to exist during Sulla's siege was generally agreed. 
But eventually also this conclusion has been doubted. It is a small remark in Charles Brittain's book 
on Philo of Larissa: 
 
«The myth of significant damage to, or the destruction of the Academy, is unfounded: both reports 
mention only the harvesting of wood by Sulla's troops – the Academy lying outside the city walls – for 
siege engines (Plutarch, Sulla 12; Appian, Mithr. 30). If Philo chose to return of Athens, and if there 
were anyone there to teach, he could have lectured in the Academy until his death» (p. 68). 
 
This brief but challenging remark occurs in the section devoted to the last years of Philo. We know 
that Philo fled with other Athenian 'optimates' to Rome in 89/88 bc, where he stayed and lectured 
                                                
3 For a full description of these events, cf. Ferrary 1988, p. 435-494. For the consequences concerning 
the philosophical schools, cf. now Sedley 2003.  
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with success for some years; and it seems safe to assume that he died in 84/83 bc4. But where did he 
died? In Rome, as the majority of scholars maintains? It is by addressing this problem that Brittain 
raises doubts about the Academy. For the general agreement that Philo never returned to Athens is 
grounded on the fact that there were no reason to come back to Athens after Sulla's destruction of the 
Academy. But if it is not true that the Academy was destroyed and that there were no colleagues and 
pupils in the Academy after Sulla's conquest what does impede that Philo returned and died in 
Athens? «If Philo chose to return to Athens, and if there was anyone there to teach, he could have 
lectured in the Academy until his death». 
Brittain's remarks are very cautious. Far from pretending to impose new views, they simply raise 
doubts about some too easily accepted facts – at least in his opinion: that Philo never returned to 
Athens, because the Academy did not exist anymore. But the consequences are considerable, insofar 
as he dimisses as a myth what had been regarded so far as an historically ascertained fact. A more 
careful analysis is therefore needed5. 
One useful point in Brittain's remark is that it helps us to see that the problems are two, not one. 
There is the problem of the destruction of the Academy and there is the problem of the cessation of 
its activities. Clearly, the two problems do not necessarily coincide. For if it is true that the first 
implies the latter, the opposite is not necessarily the case. If the Academy was destroyed it is evident 
that lectures were not given in it (and there is no evidence that they were given elsewhere in Athens, 
see below). But the closing of the activities doesn't exclusively depend on the destruction of the 
Academy: the destruction is not the only cause for the closing, and in principle nothing excludes that 
the Academy ceased to function even without being destroyed. The two problem need to be 
addressed in order. 
As for the first question is concerned, it is important to notice that the surviving testimonies do not 
explicitly say anything about the destruction of the Academy. Plutarch and Appian, our two most 
important sources, allude to the destruction of the woods but not of the Academy6; neither Cicero, in 
the prologue of De finibus V does say something explicitly. In this text Cicero reports of a visit he 
made with some of his friends to the gymnasium of the Academy in 79 b.c.: 
 
«My dear Brutus, once I had been attending a lecture of Antiochus, as I was in the habit of doing, 
with Marcus Piso, in the building called the School of Ptolemy; and with us were my brother 
Quintus, Titus Pomponius, and Lucius Cicero, whom I loved as a brother but who was really my first 
cousin. We arranged to take our afternoon stroll in the Academy, chiefly because the place would be 
quiet and deserted at that hour of the day. Accordingly at the time appointed we met at our 
                                                
4 Cf. Dorandi 1991b, p. 17-20. 
5 As a matter of fact, J. Glucker carefully reviewed Brittain's book, but he did not touch on this point, 
see Glucker 2004. 
6 One further testimony is Athenion's discourse presented by Posidonius (ap. Athen. V 213d = Posid. 
f 253 Kidd): the gymnasia are in a squalid condition and the philosophical schools silent; but on the 
reliability of the passage cf. the critical remarks in Ferrary 1988, p. 441-444. 
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rendezvous, Piso's lodgings, and starting out beguiled with conversation on various subjects the three-
quarters of a mile from the Dypilon gate. When we reached the walks of the Academy, which are so 
deservedly famous, we had then entirely to ourselves, as we had hoped. Thereupon Piso remarked: 
'Whether it is a natural istinct or a mere illusion, I can't say; but one's emotions are more strongly 
aroused by seeing the places that tradition records to have been the favourite resort of men of note in 
former days, than by hearing about their deeds or reading their writings. My own feelings at the 
present moment are a case in point. I am reminded of Plato, the first philosopher, so we are told, that 
made a practice of holding discussions in this place; and indeed the garden close at hand  yonder not 
only recalls his memory but seems to bring the actual man before my eyes. This was the haunt of 
Speusippus, of Xenocrates, and of Xenocrates' pupil Polemo, who used to sit on the very seat we see 
over there [...]. 
But I [ie Cicero], Piso, agree with you; it is a common experience that places do strongly stimulate 
the imagination and vivify our ideas of famous men. [...] All over Athens, I know, there are many 
reminders of eminent men in the actual place where they lived; but at the present moment it is that 
alcove over there which appeals to me, for not long ago it belonged to Carneades. I fancy I see him 
now (for his portrait is familiar), and I can imagine that the very place where he used to sit misses the 
sound of his voice, and mourns the loss of that mighty intellect [...]. 
'But Lucius,' he [ie Piso] asked, 'do you ned our urging, or have you a natural leaning of your own 
towards philosophy? You are keeping Antiochus's lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive 
pupil.' 'I try to be,' replied Lucius with a timid or rather a modest air; 'but have you heard any 
lectures on Carneades lately? He attracts me immensely; but Antiochus calls me in the other 
direction; and there is no other lecturer to go to' (De fin. V 1-2, 4, 6; trad. Rackham). 
 
From this text it appears that, in 79 b.c. at least, everything is in order in the Academy (the nostalgia 
is for the absence of classes not for the ruins), and this was interpreted by John Lynch as an indication 
of the fact that the Academy, after being destroyed or hevily damaged during the Mithidrtic war, had 
been «rebuilt or repaired» (Lynch, p. 187). It might be. But another conclusion one can draw from 
these testimonies is that the Academy was never destroyed or heavily damaged, as, long before 
Brittain, John Glucker had already suggested (p. 373). Perhaps it is a little bit too rude to claim that 
the destruction of the Academy is a «myth», but it is true that, on the basis of the available ancient 
sources, it cannot be taken as an historically ascertained fact. Unfortunately, the sources are too much 
scanty to permit any uncontroversial conclusion. On this point, some help will hopefully come from 
the archeologists. 
But even admitting that the Academy was not destroyed, what are the consequences for the other 
problem? In principle, if it was not destroyed, the Academy could have well continued to function. In 
principle. But do we dispose of some positive evidence? On this issue the testimonies are more 
numerous and the answer seems to be mostly negative. It is for instance uncontroversial that already 
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at Seneca's time in Athens there were no Academic teachings, be it from the institutional Academy or 
from Antiochus' school7: 
 
«Accordingly so many groups of philosophers have died out with no successor. The Academics, both 
the older and the newer, failed to leave an heir» (Nat. Quaest. VII 32, 2, trad. Lynch). 
 
Not different is Cicero's judgment in 45 b.c.: 
 
«Take for example the philosophical method referred to, that of a purely negative dialectic which 
refrains from pronouncing any postivie judgment. This, after being originated by Socrats, revived by 
Arcesilas, and reinforced by Carneades, has flourished right down to our own period; though I 
understand that in Grece itself it is now almost bereft of adherents» (De nat. deor. I 11, trad. 
Rackham). 
 
And even when we go back in time, what emerges from the remaining testimonies does not 
substantially change what is claimed in the two above-mentioned texts, as far as the Academy is 
concerned. First of all, the most important testimonies unanimously speak of Philo as the last head of 
the Academy, and this suggests that it is with him that the activity of the school ceased8. Moreover, 
this appears to be confirmed by the above mentioned text from Cicero's De finibus V. In 79 b.c. 
there was Antiochus' own school in the Ptolemaion9, but nothing in the Academy. As already John 
Lynch had noticed, «such passages suggest that the 'New Academy', the school which had evolved 
through a succession of scholars from Plato, had failed and that only the school of the 'Academic' 
eclectic Antiochus resumed operation in Athens after the Mitridatic war. Though Antiochus is often 
called a pupil of Philo, he is never said to have succeded him» (p. 181). 
Some scholars, however, have argued that there are some minor elements of Cicero's testimony that, 
if correctly taken into account, point in the opposite direction. First, there is the mention of the crowd 
gathering in the Academy in the morning: is this not an indication that there still were Academic 
lectures in the Academy? and is this not further confirmed by the allusion to 'lectures on Carneades'? 
By emphasizing this second point, David Sedley argued that in fact in 79 b.c. «there are still lectures 
in the Academy» and suggested that it is Charmades who «might have succeded Philo for a while»10. 
Undoubtedly, the proposal is intriguing, but I am not sure that the elements on which it is built suffice 
to prove it. 
                                                
7 See Glucker 1978, p. 337-342. 
8 Cf. for instance Luc. 11; Luc. 16-17; De nat. deor. I 11. 
9 The Ptolemaion was another gymnasium, inside Athens. After Glucker 1978 there is not anymore 
need to demonstrate that Antiochus has never been elected head of the Academy and that his diatribe 
in the Ptolemaion has nothing to do with the Academy. Interestingly, according to Apollodorus of 
Athens, also Charmadas seems to have lectured in the Ptolemaion, cf. Philod. Ac. Ind. XXX with 
Dorandi 1991a, p. 75-76. 
10 Sedley 1981, p. 74 n. 3; 2003, p. 34. 
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First of all, how plausible is to assume that the crowd gathering in the Academy in the morning is a 
crowd of would-be Academic philosophers? Had the Academy be still in function, and assuming that 
the crowd was there in order to attend Academic lectures, is it not strange that Cicero does not say 
anything of it11? In fact, given that the Academy was also a recreational center it is more likely that the 
crowd gathered in the area for non-philosophical purposes12. Secondly, what is implied exactly by the 
reference to Carneades in De fin. 5.6 ('lectures on Carneades' in Rackham's translation)? Indeed, it is 
disappointing that no answer is given to the question, and many conflicting interpretations can be 
suggested. For instance one can deny that there were such lectures. For what is explicitly stated in the 
text is that Lucius is attending Antiochus and not that there were 'Academic lectures'. Lucius asks 
whether there are lectures: that there were is controversial. If on the other side one admits that there 
were Academic lectures, it must also be recognized that it is not in the Academy that they were given. 
And this not only for the above reason that Cicero's silence would appear quite bizarre, but also 
because, if they were given in the Academy, Lucius, that is the one who is supposed to have attended 
those lectures, could not have attended them. For the lectures in the Academy, if there were any, 
were in the morning; but it also appears that Antiochus' lectures as well were given in the morning 
and of Piso and of the young Lucius it is said that they used to attend Antiochus's lectures («you are 
keeping Antiochus' lectures, and seem to me to be a pretty attentive pupil»), so that they couldn't be 
at the same moment in the Academy. But perhaps these lectures were given elsewhere in Athens. But 
why not in the Academy, given that, as we have seen, in 79 b.c. everything appears in order? One 
explication should be provided. And in all probability, even in that case, the teacher could not be 
Charmadas, for Cicero implies that already in 91 b.c. he was probably not anymore alive13. 
Indeed, it is difficult, not to say impossible, to definitely settle the question, and other possibilities can 
be taken into account. A third posibility one can suggest is that the were lectures on Carneades and 
that Lucius heard them, because it was Antiochus himself who was talking about Carneades in his 
classes (as is later confirmed for instance by his exploitation of the Carneadean division)14. This 
                                                
11 Glucker 1978, p. 111. 
12 Polito 2012, p. 36; Görler 1994, p. 944. 
13 Cic. De or. II 360; cf. Ferrary 1988, p. 472 n. 122; Dorandi 1994, p. 298; Dorandi 1997, p. 104. If 
one does not accept this date, it may be argued that Charmadas continued perhaps to teach for some 
time in the Academy after Philo's flight (cf. Glucker 1978, p. 108-111, 251) and perhaps elsewhere (if 
with Sedley we take him alive also in 79 b.c., see above n. ***), but nothing appears to justify the 
claim that he was the last head. Another candidate might be the rather mysterious Maecius, if it is 
correct the reading of Ind. Ac. XXXIV 2-4, cf. Dorandi 1991a. Critical remarks against the existence 
of a diadochos named 'Maikios' are in Puglia 2000 who, unconvincingly, argues that the texts says 
that there were anyhow mention of one head after Philo. The text is really too much lacunose, and 
for defending his proposal Puglia introduces some unusual terms (such as oimai) and unrequested (at 
least by all the other scholars) emendation. Unfortunately, this text is too lacunose too enable to draw 
clear informations. 
14 Cf. De fin. V 16: Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solebat: 
this clearly implies that Carneades was a subject of Antiochus' classes; cf. Bonazzi 2009, p. 37; cf. also 
Schofield 2012. 
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reading is possible and would perhaps solve many difficulties. But I do not want insist on it too much. 
Perhaps it is safer to avoid overinterpretation of this prologue! 
All in all, it can be admitted that the available testimonies do not prove beyond doubt that the 
Academy ceased to exist with Philo: true, this is nowhere attested explicitly, and some marginal 
passages raise some objections. But it is not less true that the objections are not sufficiently strong to 
resist examination. The alternative interpretations are even more difficult to accept. The testimonies 
do not justify the claim that there was someone, Charmadas perhaps, lecturing on Carneades in the 
Academy. On the base of the informations we presently have, the most reasonable conclusion is that 
the Academy ceased its activities with Philo's flight to Rome; and, if it is fair to assume that Philo 
remained also in Rome the official school head, one may date the closing of the Academy with Philo's 
death in 84/83 b.c.15, or in any case in the period between 88 and 84 b.c. 
Be that as it may, there is a most interesting fact that emerges by the available testimonies, and it is the 
conflictual relationship of the philosophers who were attached to the Academy16. A symptomatic case 
is the famous enconter in Alexandria in 87 b.c., reported in Cicero's Lucullus (10-11): two 
philosopher, Antiochus of Ascalon and Heraclitus of Tyre, both members of the Academy for a long 
period, meet and talk about the views of a third Academic philosopher, Philo of Larissa, the 
diadochos in exile. And the three philosophers defend three different positions, often in a polemical 
tone. If it is further added that Aenesidemus as well was a product of the Academy and that in that 
very period he was defending a fourth position, promoting a new form of scepticism in polemical 
opposition to all the other Academics, the temptation is strong to conclude that it really makes no 
senso to speak of the Academy in the singular. It is true that also earlier there had been polemics and 
secession (one can think of Clitomachus and Metrodorus), but here the divergence appears to be 
radical, and it is not to exclude that also these struggles proved determinant in the last years of the 
Academy. 
In sum, one conclusion appears as the most probable and some explanations can be provided. In all 
probability, the Academy ceased its activities with Philo's flight to Rome and subsequent death, and 
in this sense at least the Mithridatic war can be regarded as having played a role in the history of the 
Academy: if not for the physical distruction, as John Lynch suggested, for it was the cause that forced 
Philo to abandon Athens. To explain the closing of the Academy some further reasons can be added. 
In the long period, as John Glucker rightly remarked, one must not neglect the growing importance 
of Oriental centers such as Alexandria, Rhodes, Aphrodisias etc.: «the Easterners had discovered that 
they could do at home what they had been doing in Athens all these generations, and the teaching of 
philosophy was restablished in the East»17. Before, on the other side, the impact of struggles, 
                                                
15 Probably in Rome? For a recent attempt, cf. Puglia 2000, p. 200 (not mentioned in Brittain 2001). 
16 Cf. also Glucker 1978, p. 109. 
17 Glucker 1978, p. 377. More in general, on the impact of the 'decentralisation of philosophy', see 
Sedley 2003. 
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contrapositions and internal secessions must not be neglected: also these dissents played an important 
role and contributed to the collapse of the institution when the head was absent: 
 
 This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang but with a whimper (T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men) 
 
An Academic without the Academy: Antiochus 
One major figure in the last years of the Academy is Antiochus of Ascalon, and it is Antiochus' alleged 
secession that notoriously provoked vehement reactions. It is therefore worth focusing on him for a 
better reconstruction of the last period of the Academy. At first sight, it may appear that the polemics 
between Antiochus and Philo are unfruitful (this is for instance Aenesidemus' view); in fact it will 
emerge that at stake there was a substatial issue. 
In spite of the fragmentary sources, many of the relevant facts of Antiochus' biography are known; 
above all, for what concerns its relationship with the Academy, it is confirmed by the sources that 1) 
he spent a remarkable period within the Academy endorsing Philo's 'official scepticism', 2) before 
modifying his views and 3) finally founding his own school, the one in which we find Cicero in 79 b.c. 
(see Cic. De fin. V 1-6 quoted above): as John Glucker definitively demonstrated Antiochus was 
never elected as head of the Academy after Philo. What is more difficult to establish is when 
Antiochus seceeded and founded his own school. Once again, at stake are two problems, one 
dependent on the other: and if on the first it is possible to find an agreement, on the second the 
divergences are less easy to settle. 1) When did Antiochus started to react against scepticism? As a 
matter of fact, on this point there is a wide agreement and scholars, with the notable exception of 
Fladerer, are unanymous in arguing that Antiochus' contrast with Philo began much earlier than the 
so-called 'Sosus affair' in 87/86 b.c.; the contrats began in the nineties18. 2) But, this being the case, 
once he started to disagree with the offical head of the school, what did Antiochus decided to do? Did 
he remain in the Academy or rather decided to abandon it, lecturing elsewhere (perhaps in the 
Ptolomaeum)? David Sedley, followed by Roberto Polito, argued that Antiochus remained within the 
Academy until Philo's flight; it is only when the Academy ceased to function that Antiochus officially 
started his own diatribe. The main evidence is a passage from Cicero's Lucullus, where Cicero the 
Academic mouthpiece complains that Antiochus did not go over to the Stoic school, once he 
abandoned scepticism: 
 
«But first let us have a few words with Antiochus, who studied under Philo the very doctrines that I 
am championing for such a long time that it was agreed that nobody has studied them longer and 
who also wrote upon these subjects with the greatest penetration, and who nevertheless in his old age 
denounced this system, not more keenly than he had previously been in the habit of defending it. 
Although therefore he have been penetrating, as indeed he was, nevertheless lack of consistency does 
                                                
18 Cf. for instance J. Glucker 1978, p. 19-21; Barnes, p. 68-70. 
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diminish the weight of authority. For I am curious to know the exact date of the day whose dawning 
light revealed to him that mark of truth and falsehood which he had for many years been in the habit 
of denying. Did he think something original? His pronouncements are the same as those of the Stoics. 
Did he become dissatisfied with his former opinions? Why didn't he go over to another school, and 
most of all why not to the Stoics? for that disagreement with Philo was the special tenet of the Stoic 
school. What, was he dissatisfied with Mnesarchus? or with Dardanus? they were the leaders of the 
Stoics at Athens at the time. He never distanced himself from Philo, except after he had begun to 
have his own audience. But why this sudden revival of the Old Academy? It is thought that he 
wanted to retain the dignity of the name in spite of abandoning the reality – for in fact some persons 
did aver that his motive was ostentation, and even that he hoped that his followers would be styled 
the School of Antiochus. But I am more inclined to think that he was unable to withstand the united 
attack of all the philosophers (for although they have certain things in common on all the other 
subjects, this is the one doctrine of the Academics that no one of the other schools approve); and 
accordingly he gave way, and, just like people who cannot bear the sund under the New Row, took 
refugee from the heat in the shade of the Old Academy, as they do in the shadow of the Balconies 
(Luc. 69-70, trad. Rackham sl. mod.)». 
 
Why didn't he go over to the Stoics? If he did not defect to the Stoics, Sedley and Polito argue, this 
means that did not leave the Academy, in spite of his dissatisfaction with scepticism19. But does the 
texts imply that? I do not think so, and another more correct explanation is possible, provided that 
one takes in due consideration the polemical context. Indeed, here it is matter not so much of an 
historically-detached reports as of polemical attacks. Cicero the Academic is charging Antiochus for 
being a Stoic, and the question is: given that he was a Stoic why didn't he go with them? From an 
Antiochean point of view, the answer is simple: because he was not a Stoic20. From the beginning to 
the end of his career Antiochus was crystal-clear that he was an Academic heir of Plato's philosophy 
and Old Academy; it was rather his adversaries who charged him for being a Stoic; Antiochus 
himself, if he was ready to take into account the Stoic doctrines, he did it on the assumption that they 
were somehow compatible with the Old Academic ones; it is not by chance, then, that he presented 
his school as the Old Academy. Alone by itself, the polemical accusation of being a Stoic does not 
mean much. 
In fact, the most important adfirmation of this passage is the following: «he never distanced himself 
from Philo except after he had begun to have his own audience». For, as Myrto Hatzimichali 
correctly remarked (p. 14), this phrase «suggests that once the loyalty of these followers was secured, 
he did distance himself». Now, as John Glucker has already remarked (p. 18), since we see him in 
                                                
19 Sedley 1981, p. 70; Polito 2012, p. 32-34. 
20 I argue for this view in Bonazzi 2012. 
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Alexandria already with his pupils, this clearly means that he seceded before the trip to Alexandria21. 
How much before? Unfortunately, the source are not eloquent on this point, and one might admit 
both: either that he distanced himsef when Philo went to Rome or that he had already seceded. 
Perhaps slight indication in favour of the latter option is in what Cicero writes in the above mentioned 
passage: Antiochus defected after he began to have followers: in order to have followers he did not 
need to wait Philo's departure (Hatzimichali aptly lists a number of parallel cases of philosophers 
'distancing themselves' in consequence of a doctrinal divergence with the official head, p. 15). But I 
am afraid that this is asking too much from the texts: in fact, it is probably safer to suspend judgment 
with Jonathan Barnes on this specific point (p. 70). 
In any case, be that as it may, what is interesting is what is at stake in this controversy: the struggle is 
not for the institutional property but for the philosophical tradition. In other words, at stake is Plato's 
philosophical heritage and the controversy is about what it does mean to be a follower of Plato. On 
this point as well some qualifications are perhaps in order. For it is usually assumed, consciouly or not, 
that the controversy was between Philo the Academic, that is the sceptic, and Antiochus the 
dogmatist, be it Stoic or Platonist. But is this correct? If not properly qualified, I am afraid that this 
opposition is misleading both for Antiochus and Philo. First, Antiochus. In fact, as I have already 
remarked, Antiochus never regarded himself as a Stoic but always as a follower of Plato. Does this 
mean that we can take him simply as a Platonist, that is a dogmatist as opposed to scepticism? Not 
literally, for he regarded himself as an Academic, as it can be detected by the name he gave to his 
diatribe. An important point which has not yet received due attention is that the term 'Academic' did 
not immediately come to be an equivalent of 'sceptic'. For we know of at least three other philosopher 
who adopted the term without committing themselves to the sceptical Academy of the Hellenistic 
centuries, Eudorus of Alexandria (second half of the first cent. b.c.), Plutarch of Chaeronea (I-II cent. 
a.d.) and the anonymous commentator to the Theaetetus (probably to be dated to I-II cent. a.d.). 
These three philosophers diverge on many questions and with Antiochus. But they all agree in using 
the term in a non-sceptical sense. The term is used in order to claim allegiance to the school of Plato, 
and by consequence, and most importantly, to his philosophy22. 
If this is correct, it also follows that the same applies also in the case of Philo. When regarding himself 
as an Academic, Philo was primarily and emphatically claiming for his Platonic dependence, and only 
secondarily for a sceptical stance in the philosophicl debate. In other words, Philo and Antiochus 
agree on the primary sense of 'Academic', which is connected to Plato's philosophy. Where they do 
diverge is on what Plato's philosophy consists in: in a positive system later endorsed and developed by 
                                                
21 More cautiously, cf. also Barnes, p. 70. Polito's attempt at arguing that Aristus, Aristo and Dion 
were not Antiochus' pupils is not convincing. In his Ac. ind. Philodemus lists them as Antiochus' 
pupils and there is not reason to deny this testimony. 
22 On this see Bonazzi 2012 forthcoming with further bibliography (still fundamental is Glucker 1978, 
p. 205-226). 
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Aristotle and the Stoics too or in a sceptical investigation? It is in this sense that the we should speak 
of Academic fighting Academics23. 
As a matter of fact, history tells us that the war had a winner: even though many of his doctrines were 
decisely rejected, it was Antiochus' view that had the upper hand: from the second half of the second 
century a.d. the dominant idea is that Plato's philosophy has nothing to do with scepticism, which is 
rather considered as the Dark Ages of the history of Platonism. And the subsequent adoption of the 
term Platonikos as the technical term definitely distanced the term Akademaikos from Plato: from the 
second century a.d. Akademaikos basically means 'sceptic' and the connection with Plato is 
progressively lost. But history, at least for those who do not profess an Hegelian credo, does not settle 
philosophical questions: that it was the dogmatist view that won and influenced the subsequent 
centuries to the extent that Platonism is often synomimous of dogmatism does not mean much. If 
philosophy is nothing but «a series of footnotes to Plato» (Whitehead), also the Hellenistic Platonism 
should be taken into account, as scholars too rarely do. 
 
Mauro Bonazzi 
Università degli Studi di Milano 
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